By Caitlin Chin

Though there’s a normal sentiment amongst lawmakers within the European Union (EU) and United States that competitors reform could also be essential to curb anticompetitive practices by dominant digital platforms, there may be significantly much less consensus over which firms any new ex ante laws ought to apply to. In a bipartisan letter to President Biden final month, 30 members of Congress criticized the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), arguing that the draft laws “unfairly targets American employees by deeming sure U.S. expertise firms as ‘gatekeepers’ based mostly on intentionally discriminatory and subjective thresholds.” These legislators, together with different critics, contend that the proposed EU competitors guidelines—which might deal with practices like self-preferencing, anti-steering, information entry, information portability, and interoperability—comprise standards that may primarily pertain to a small variety of U.S. companies like Meta, Apple, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft, whereas doubtlessly exempting many EU or Chinese language platforms.

However to these following antitrust developments in america, their objections might sound acquainted. Whereas the Home Judiciary Committee voted in favor of six competitors payments in June 2021 to deal with comparable practices, and the Senate Judiciary Committee superior Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Chuck Grassley’s (R-Iowa) American Innovation and Alternative On-line Act in January 2022, a number of of those U.S. federal payments additionally face some inside challenges from members of each events over the scope of their utility. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) just lately summarized such issues, stating that “it’s troublesome to see the justification for a invoice that regulates the conduct of solely a handful of firms, whereas permitting everybody else to proceed participating in that very same conduct.”

Lined platforms and gatekeepers in america and European Union

Each the U.S. and EU laws would solely apply to firms that fall inside sure categorical or dimension thresholds. Klobuchar and Grassley’s American Innovation and Alternative On-line Act would usually suggest new nondiscrimination necessities for “lined platforms” with (1) at the very least 50 million U.S. month-to-month energetic customers or 100,000 U.S. month-to-month energetic enterprise customers; (2) a market capitalization or web annual gross sales of over $550 billion; and (3) the power to limit person searches, user-generated content material, or gross sales of third-party items or providers. The Home payments that superior out of committee final 12 months—together with Reps. David Cicilline (D-RI) and Lance Gooden’s (R-Texas) American Alternative and Innovation On-line Act and Reps. Gooden and Pramila Jayapal’s (D-WA) Ending Platform Monopolies Act—comprise comparable requirements, besides with the next market capitalization threshold of $600 billion. Just like the DMA, these measures additionally seem to focus on Apple, Meta, Google, and Amazon underneath present market situations (with some uncertainty over whether or not it will additionally cowl Microsoft), though different digital platforms might doubtlessly qualify in the event that they develop in dimension sooner or later.

In December 2020, the European Fee proposed sure quantitative standards to outline “gatekeepers,” or the digital platforms which might usually be topic to the DMA’s new pro-competition guidelines: firms that function in at the very least three member states with (1) both €6.5 billion in annual gross income throughout the European Financial Space (EEA) or a €65 billion total market capitalization and (2) 45 million energetic month-to-month customers and 10,000 annual energetic enterprise customers throughout the EU. In December 2021, the European Parliament voted to amend the primary threshold to €eight billion in web income within the EEA or an €80 billion market capitalization respectively. Nonetheless, each the European Fee and Parliament variations inject some extent of subjectivity into this definition. Corporations that meet these quantitative requirements should be exempt from the provisions of the act, both via “distinctive circumstances” or “additional investigations.” Alternatively, these which fall in need of the metrics might nonetheless be required to adjust to the DMA if the European Fee determines that “it’s foreseeable that it’ll get pleasure from [an entrenched and durable] place within the close to future.”

Concentrate on community results and information, not market capitalization

Regardless of the opposition from some legislators, it’s comprehensible that each Congress and the European Fee need to goal antitrust reform towards giant expertise firms which have the best potential to pose anticompetitive harms. Particularly, the Home Antitrust Subcommittee majority investigation, which concluded in 2020, not solely discovered that Amazon, Apple, Google, and Meta had been collectively price over $5 trillion at the moment, however that that they had engaged in conduct that included self-preferencing their very own services on their platforms, buying potential rivals, and extra. Such issues are magnified by tendencies of rising market focus within the broader U.S. and EU economies over the previous few a long time, particularly in industries like engines like google or e-commerce, in addition to declining startup formation and better charges of merger and acquisition (M&A) exercise in america throughout this era. Accordingly, the controversy shouldn’t focus on whether or not or not laws ought to goal dominant platforms, however which metrics are acceptable to find out which platforms ought to be lined.

When setting goal standards to find out whether or not a selected firm is dominant sufficient to require new ex ante competitors guidelines, the problem is to each anticipate dangers of anticompetitive harms and to search out benchmarks that may synchronously apply to platforms with differing enterprise fashions or located inside various or undefined markets. Market capitalization might look like one apparent alternative for legislators, because it presents a seemingly simple benchmark to both embrace or exclude firms from authorized compliance with an act. When the UK sought public feedback in July 2021 over the scope of a brand new Digital Markets Unit to supervise expertise firms inside its present Competitors and Markets Authority, it commented on the usefulness of clear metrics by which to prioritize circumstances: “a agency’s income supplies a sign of the size of hurt that would consequence from a agency’s market energy, so is a helpful proxy [that] would additionally present extra readability to companies—notably smaller digital companies—on whether or not they’re more likely to be assessed for designation.” Though the UK public session doesn’t particularly reference market capitalization or quite a lot of customers, the EU and U.S. laws pairs market capitalization and income collectively. Market capitalization is a bigger figuring out issue than income for Meta, Google, Apple, and Amazon underneath the U.S. laws, since every firm presently has a valuation of above $550 billion however annual web incomes beneath that benchmark within the earlier two years.

However what makes these 4 expertise firms completely different from the monopolists of the previous—and what any new antitrust legislation ought to acknowledge—is just not their market capitalization, however their enterprise fashions that profit from huge information assortment and community results. By way of merchandise like Amazon Fundamentals, Google Search, Instagram, and the App Retailer, these 4 firms typically cost particular person customers both no or low financial charges for sure providers—however accumulate important quantities of non-public info (together with geolocation, shopping or purchasing historical past, images or movies, machine identifiers, and extra), which can be utilized to focus on commercials, develop algorithms, and enhance services or products. Moreover, every of the 4 platforms has amassed lots of of thousands and thousands of customers after which profit from community results—the place people are extra probably to make use of platforms that have already got huge person or vendor bases, and the place a platform’s worth exponentially will increase based mostly on their reputation. Newer startups don’t replicate this identical variety of customers or these information troves, which, arguably greater than income or market capitalization, entrenches giant gamers out there.

Regardless of the readability {that a} benchmark like market capitalization would convey, an organization can nonetheless use community results and its accumulation of huge information even no matter its financial valuation. On February 2, Meta’s inventory value plummeted over 26% in a single day, equal to an approximate capitalization lack of $230 billion—the place it has hovered for the previous month and a half at a valuation underneath $600 billion, beneath the brink of the Home laws. Despite the fact that the Home payments would preserve some buffer towards unpredictable inventory market fluctuation by making use of to firms with a market capitalization of $600 billion at any level throughout the previous two years, this occasion nonetheless demonstrates that an organization like Meta can lose or achieve a major quantity of market worth with out an equally significant change in its variety of customers, information assortment practices, market dominance, or M&A technique. In different phrases, market capitalization primarily measures an organization’s dimension—it doesn’t essentially parallel its potential to pose anticompetitive harms. To keep away from exempting dominant platforms from any new pro-competition guidelines, it will make sense to considerably decrease the market capitalization threshold in U.S. antitrust laws, and even remove it from consideration in any respect.

Qualitative requirements for market dominance

With a proposed market capitalization threshold of €80 billion—only a fraction of the respective $550 and $600 billion benchmarks within the U.S. Senate and Home payments—the EU’s DMA targets a small variety of dominant digital platforms even with a a lot decrease market valuation threshold. Partially, it is because the DMA additionally considers extra qualitative metrics, equivalent to whether or not a possible gatekeeper has a “important affect” on a market, to both embrace or exclude platforms from the provisions of the invoice, along with its quantitative thresholds. In its public session, the UK equally proposed qualitative metrics to contemplate which competitors circumstances the Digital Markets Unit would possibly prioritize, together with whether or not community results and obstacles to entry would possibly exacerbate focus in a selected market, and whether or not different sector-specific entities exist to manage sure firms.

The EU and UK fashions additionally embrace different elements, aside from numerical requirements like market capitalization, that target the potential harms from market focus. The US would possibly contemplate the same strategy. The Senate and Home payments each presently authorize the Federal Commerce Fee (FTC) and Division of Justice (DOJ) to designate “lined platforms” based mostly on the quantitative standards talked about above, however Congress might go additional to specify extra, extra qualitative pointers for the businesses to contemplate relying on the focused enterprise follow, equivalent to scope of information assortment, strategic function of community results, and some other elements which will improve market focus, obstacles to entry, or total place to impose anticompetitive situations for both particular person customers or different companies.

Primarily based on these extra qualitative concerns, Congress ought to direct the FTC and DOJ to ascertain a course of to solicit stakeholder enter on whether or not a enterprise ought to or shouldn’t qualify as a “lined platform” underneath an act—even when an organization both doesn’t or solely partially meets the opposite quantitative benchmarks outlined in laws. Likewise, Congress also needs to direct the FTC and DOJ to periodically consider and regulate each the quantitative and qualitative standards for a lined platform to account for any future adjustments in expertise, enterprise fashions, macroeconomic situations, or total markets for digital platforms. For instance, each the EU and U.S. laws presently embrace the variety of customers as a quantitative consider a platform’s eligibility—and though it is a related consideration for digital market dominance, particularly given the function of community results, evolving market situations and demographic tendencies over a long time might name for changes within the particular numerical figures. General, this process would enable federal enforcement businesses to conduct a extra detailed evaluation to find out which particular person firms ought to be topic to new ex ante competitors guidelines, thus addressing the problem that Congress would in any other case face to pick out statutory standards that anticipates market dominance over a wide range of industries, enterprise fashions, and altering market situations.

In conclusion, each Congress and the European Fee are proper to direct competitors scrutiny towards Massive Tech. But, many giant digital platforms derive their true energy from their customers, community results, and huge scope of information assortment. Market capitalization, whereas typically hefty, is just not an vital measure by which to find out which dominant digital platforms ought to be required to adjust to any new pro-competition guidelines.


Amazon, Apple, Google, and Fb are normal, unrestricted donors to the Brookings Establishment. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions posted on this piece are solely these of the creator and never influenced by any donation.

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