By Shuxian Luo

On October 23, China adopted a land border legislation, which is able to take impact on January 1, 2022, in an endeavor to strengthen its border management and safety. Just like the coast guard legislation and maritime site visitors security legislation enacted earlier this yr, the brand new legislation is handed amid heightened tensions between China and its neighbors over border disputes. On its land periphery, China has been locked in a protracted face-off with India alongside their disputed border since Could 2020. Whereas the brand new legislation has galvanized speculations as as to whether it could be used to justify a extra assertive Chinese language posture, it clearly goes past that particular dispute and speaks to a bunch of issues as Beijing strives to safe its land border amid rising uncertainty in its neighborhood.


By way of the enactment of this new legislation, Beijing seems to be signaling dedication to resolve the border disputes on its most well-liked phrases. The legislation units an general tone of resolve upfront, stating that China will “resolutely defend territorial sovereignty and land border safety” whereas persevering with to hunt to settle disputes by means of negotiations.

In streamlining the division of labor amongst numerous bureaucracies together with the overseas ministry, the general public safety ministry, and the customs and immigration administrations, the legislation specifies that the Folks’s Liberation Military (PLA) and the paramilitary Folks’s Armed Police (PAP), each beneath the command of the Central Army Fee, will bear the foremost duty for safeguarding land border, resisting armed invasion, and responding to main contingencies. It authorizes patrol officers to make use of police devices and weapons towards intruders who resort to violence in resisting detention and threaten the security of life and property of different folks. It additionally authorizes the bureaucracies to collaborate with neighboring nations in combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and non secular extremism.

The legislation notably emphasizes the position of Chinese language residents and civilian establishments in supporting the PLA and PAP — a possible manifestation of the “civil-military fusion technique” in land border protection. A comparability of an earlier draft of the legislation and the ultimate textual content is revealing on this regard. The draft launched in August consists of just one sentence requiring residents and civilian organizations to help the PLA and PAP. Within the ultimate textual content, this sentence is expanded right into a separate clause. The newly added clause requires native governments in border areas to allocate sources to strengthen the constructing of “mass protection teams” (群防队伍建设) to help border protection missions. The idea of “mass protection” for borders, in line with writings by Chinese language safety analysts, means to attract on native residents to help with missions together with info assortment, order upkeep, and sovereignty and territorial protection.

The legislation outlines 4 circumstances that may immediate border shutdown, port closure, or different “emergency measures”:

  1. when a warfare or armed battle breaks out on the periphery and threatens China’s border safety and stability;
  2. when a significant incident poses a grave menace to nationwide safety or the life and property of residents within the border space;
  3. when the border space is threatened because of a pure catastrophe, public well being incident, or nuclear, organic, or chemical air pollution;
  4. different conditions that severely affect the land border and safety and stability in border areas.

The legislation additionally reiterates the state’s dedication to opening up these areas to the skin world and bettering native public service and infrastructure, aiming to strike a stability between border protection and socioeconomic improvement. The legislation additionally pledges state help for setting up border cities with improved capabilities and capability and cross-border cooperation zones to advertise commerce, tourism, and ecological safety.


A number of elements appear to have motivated the adoption of the legislation now. First, this legislation displays Beijing’s renewed issues over the safety of its land border whereas it confronts a slew of unsettled disputes on its maritime entrance. In contrast to the coast guard legislation lengthy pushed for by China’s maritime safety businesses, requires laws governing land border protection appear extra sporadic, most likely as a result of China settled most of its land border by the early 2000s and has since confronted a comparatively secure frontier. However the confrontations on the Sino-Indian borders lately could have reminded Beijing that as a basic land-sea energy (海陆复合型国家), China should at all times prepared itself to deal with threats in each the continental and maritime domains.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic additionally underscores the crucial for Beijing to exert larger management over its considerably porous land border. In April 2020, when the virus had been contained inside China however was quickly spreading worldwide, the Chinese language State Council warned of a rising danger of cross-border transmission and prioritized prevention in frontier areas. The newest wave of breakouts in border cities in Yunnan, Xinjiang, and Internal Mongolia solely reinforce that evaluation.

Furthermore, this legislation displays Beijing’s thinly-veiled worries concerning the stability of its hinterland bordering Central Asia. The withdrawal of U.S. forces and Taliban takeover aggravated Beijing’s issues that an Afghanistan slowed down in protracted turmoil and humanitarian disasters could turn into a hotbed for terrorism and extremism that might unfold to Xinjiang.

Home politics may additionally be at play. The legislation enshrines President Xi Jinping’s signature ethnic minority coverage line, “forging a consciousness of the widespread identification of the Chinese language nation” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识) by means of strengthened propaganda and indoctrination. Criticized by some observers as a euphemism for coercive ethnic assimilation, this coverage was proposed by Xi on the 2014 central convention on Xinjiang, endorsed in his 19th Social gathering Congress report in 2017, and reiterated at central conferences on Tibet and Xinjiang in 2020. It’s noteworthy that the sooner draft of the legislation accommodates just one sentence referring to the necessity to reinforce Chinese language residents’ “homeland safety consciousness” with out mentioning Xi’s system. The ultimate textual content expands this sentence right into a separate clause and provides Xi’s phrase, a transfer most likely meant to additional bolster his standing within the lead-up to the 20th Social gathering Congress subsequent yr when he would safe a 3rd time period.


Within the context of Sino-Indian disputes, implementing the legislation might be problematic in a number of methods. First, though the road of precise management (LAC) has served as a de facto border between China and India since their 1962 warfare, the 2 sides disagree over the place it lies in not less than 13 places. Given the dearth of a mutually acceptable border, how China handles Indian personnel it sees as illegally crossing the border could have a nontrivial bearing on developments alongside the border.

Second, the legislation prohibits the development of everlasting amenities close to China’s border with out permission from Chinese language authorities. The imprecise wording might be interpreted to incorporate each side of the border, creating the potential for extra frictions as each China and India have engaged in an “infrastructure arms race” on their respective sides of the LAC.

Third, with an emphasis on the event of border cities and the position of civilians, the legislation could increase questions on whether or not Beijing intends to increase or speed up civilian settlement in areas bordering India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Whereas border city improvement resonates with China’s home agenda of “creating the border areas, enriching the native folks” (兴边富民) articulated in 1999 and built-in into China’s five-year plans, it might be perceived as legitimizing a land model of the “salami-slicing” tactic that China is seen as using in its maritime disputes.

This legislation additionally tackles points distinctive to China’s border with North Korea by prohibiting utilizing sound, lighting, or indicators; floating supplies by means of air or water; or participating in different actions close to the border which will have an effect on China’s “pleasant relations” with neighboring nations. This resembles a latest South Korean legislation banning activist teams and defectors from sending supplies vital of the North Korean regime throughout the 38th parallel.

Domestically, to the extent that Beijing sees an in depth hyperlink between reinforcing a “widespread identification of the Chinese language nation” and consolidating management over China’s ethnic minority-populated land frontier, as is obvious on this legislation, modulation in Beijing’s present coverage towards these areas is probably not over the horizon.

Sooner or later, Beijing may invoke the legislation to shut China’s border to forestall the spillover of terrorism and extremism from Central Asia, an inflow of refugees from North Korea, Myanmar, or Afghanistan, or the unfold of a pandemic.

Whereas China would possibly see a reputable want for a authorized framework to handle a greater than 22,000-kilometer land border with 14 neighboring nations, it might probably preserve some wiggle room in implementation and management the danger of sudden incidents particularly alongside the unsettled border. India is prone to stand its floor, however ought to talk to Beijing that further incidents can be in neither facet’s curiosity and would solely reinforce the present diplomatic deadlock in negotiating for disengagement. As for the USA, it ought to increase its issues to Beijing concerning the potential implications of the legislation, however ought to achieve this by means of diplomatic channels to keep away from placing Beijing able the place it feels it should defy Washington by aggressively implementing the legislation.


Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here